I. INTRODUCTION
In Lockyer v. Andrade, the United States Supreme Court held the California Court of Appeal did not err in its interpretation of Court precedent.' That court held that sentencing a convict under the California three strikes law to fifty years to life in prison for two counts of petty theft 2 was not "contrary to" or "an unreasonable application of' Supreme Court jurisprudence .
The defendant, Leandro Andrade, had challenged his sentence under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 4 This Note examines the opinions in Lockyer and concludes that the law of the Supreme Court in the area of the Eighth Amendment's application to a term-of-years sentence was ambiguous at best. This ambiguity led the Supreme Court to correctly conclude that the California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply Federal law when it reviewed Andrade's Eight Amendment claim. The majority opinion authored by Justice O'Connor provides clarity in this area by showing substantial deference to the laws of the States. Lockyer demonstrates the Court's reluctance to interfere with States' administration of their criminal justice systems. Additionally, the majority opinion comports with congressional goals of limiting the abuse of Federal habeas corpus to review by state prisoners. Justice Souter's dissenting opinion is mistaken because it relied entirely on only one case. Moreover, if applied, the dissent's analysis would result in a flood of prisoner litigation aimed at rendering their sentences null under their respective State sentencing schemes, and thus does not respect the State's right to determine its own penological system. Finally, the dissent fails to recognize that the proper body for changing the California sentencing scheme is not the Supreme Court, but rather the legislature of the State of California.
II. BACKGROUND A. CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAW
In June 1992, eighteen-year-old Kimber Reynolds came home to Fresno for a friend's wedding. Two parolees passed by her riding on a motorcycle and tried to grab her purse. 6 When Kimber fought back, the driver shot her in the head with a .357 caliber handgun. 7 She died two days later. 8 The driver was killed by police in a shootout. 9 The accomplice received a nine year sentence, and was eligible for parole again after he served half his term.' 0 Kimber's death began a crusade by her father to strengthen criminal sentencing laws in California, and he authored the "three strikes" concept."' In April 1993, Reynold's idea received a cold reception from the California legislature, which killed his bill in committee. 12 He believed the only way to toughen sentencing was through submission of a proposition directly to the people of California.' 3 He faced an uphill battle, with no political support and no money to finance a voter awareness campaign.14 Later that year twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was kidnapped from her bedroom in her Petaluma home.' 5 The search for Polly garnered national media attention and ended with the discovery of her body in December. ' The statute operates on past felonies that are "serious" or "violent" under California law. 3 ' Representative violent felonies include murder, rape, kidnapping, and felonies committed with a firearm. 32 Serious felonies include such offenses as selling illegal drugs to minors, first degree burglary, witness intimidation, and armed assault. 33 However, subsection 1170.12(c)(2)(A) does not limit the type of felony considered a third strike. 34 The statute specifies only that it governs the term for the current felony. 35 Thus, any felony conviction can trigger application of the three strike sentence enhancement. 3 6 Other provisions in the statute are designed to ensure its intent to incarcerate multiple offenders is not frustrated. 37 Several such provisions are implicated in Andrade's case. 8 For instance, the statute allows all prior felonies to be counted against a defendant because it has no time limitation after which a felony could not be used as a potential strike. 39 Also, the statute mandates consecutive sentencing for felonies not committed on the same occasion that do not arise from the same operative facts. 40 In other words, a felon with two prior strikes and two current felony counts can face two separate invocations of the three strikes law at sentencing. 41 However, the statute does not completely remove all sentencing discretion. Indeed, the statute allows prosecutors to move to dismiss a prior felony conviction so that it will not be counted as a strike. 42 Additionally, the California Supreme Court granted trial courts the power to dismiss a prior felony from the strike count sua sponte if dismissal serves the interests of justice. 43 Application of the California three strikes provision has generated much wailing and gnashing of academic teeth. 44 Many writers take exception to the application and overall merit of the three strikes law, and their arguments are not without virtue. For example, the validity of the statute would be questionable should it fail to reduce crime. 45 The law should be revamped if it catches and incarcerates criminals as they near the age when they cease criminal activity. 6 Disproportionate application based on race also implicates the basic fairness of the statute. 4 7 Economic costs of increased incarceration may threaten State budget vitality. 4 8 Some statistics, however, demonstrate the success of the law. 49 According to a report published in 1999 by Bill Jones, the California Secretary of State at the time, the four year period following passage of three strikes saw a massive drop in crime. 50 For example, 1994 to 1998 comparisons showed a 51.5% drop in homicide, an 18.7% drop in rape, and a 48.6% drop in robbery. 5 ' The report pegs societal economic saving from crime reduction over the same period to be between $8.2 billion and $21.7 billion. 52 These statistics, while compelling, are not immune to criticism, primarily driven by the notion that the strong economy affected crime in that time period. 3 
B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
The Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of "cruel and unusual punishment. ' 54 Three areas of jurisprudence have evolved in cases dealing with what is cruel and unusual punishment. First, the Eighth Amendment forbids punishment in some instances. 55 Second, the Eighth Amendment restricts the use of certain kinds of punishment.
5 6 Finally, the Eighth Amendment contains a requirement that punishment imposed not be grossly disproportionate to the crime committed. 5 The text of the Eighth Amendment comes verbatim from the English Bill of Rights. 8 The first Congress adopted the Eighth Amendment as part of the Bill of Rights, including the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause, in 1791. 9 Most of the early commentaries surrounding the clause, and state court decisions interpreting their constitutions' respective similar clauses, indicate it forbade the imposition of certain types of punishment. 6°M uch debate exists over whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies to prison terms. 61 The proportionality principle asserts that a term-of-years punishment may not be grossly disproportionate to the underlying offense. 62 In other words, the proportionality principle assesses "the relationship between the nature and number of offenses committed and the severity of the punishment imposed., 63 The concept of proportionality entered Eighth Amendment Supreme Court jurisprudence in a dissent by Justice Field in O'Neil v. Vermont. 64 Twelve years later, the Court overturned the conviction of an American coast guardsman that resulted in a sentence of fifteen years at hard labor in chains, and a fine. 65 Weems was convicted in a Philippine [Vol. 94 court of falsifying a document in the Philippine jurisdiction, which at the time was an American administered territory. 66 The Philippine court relied on Spanish law, which did not require a mens rea, when it convicted Weems. 67 It also based Weems' sentence on Spanish law. 68 The Court compared the sentence to those available under United States law for similar offenses, and then noted that more serious offenses in the Philippines carried the same punishment as imposed in the instant case, before holding the punishment was disproportionate to the crime.
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More recently, the Supreme Court has entertained challenges to state criminal laws that impose lengthy term-of-years punishment for nonviolent felonies. One of these statutes was held unconstitutional based on the theory that it violated the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principal. 7°T he line of cases dealing with the proportionality of state recidivist sentencing requirements began in 1980 with Rummel v. Estelle.
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In Rummel, 7 2 the Court held that a life sentence for a third nonviolent felony conviction mandated by a Texas recidivist statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment when applied to the defendant. 7 3 The defendant's third conviction was a theft offense for $120.75. 74 His two prior offenses were both theft related nonviolent felonies; the first for fraudulent use of a credit card for eighty dollars, and the second for writing a $28.36 bad check. 75 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist noted that most of the successful proportionality challenges to state punishment schemes came to the court in the context of death penalty cases. 76 Rehnquist then divided proportionality challenges of death penalty statutes from challenges of statutes that impose a term-ofyears punishment. 77 He differentiated Weems based on that Court's references to accompaniments (hard labor, chains) to the length of the sentence. 7 8 Finally, Rehnquist asserted that because the defendant's convictions were for felonies, the state legislature had the power to determine the proper term-of-years sentence as punishment. 79 However,
Rehnquist recognized the possibility of invalidating punishment based on a state statute if the statute mandated extreme punishment for a trivial offense, such as life in prison for overtime parking violations.
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Dissenting in Rummel, 8 1 Justice Powell argued that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment commands proportionality analysis not only in the context of death penalty cases but also for sentences imposing a term-of-years punishment. 82 He understood the difficulty present in subjecting state sentencing schemes to the review of federal judges. 83 So Powell attempted to distill three criteria utilized in other Supreme Court cases.
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The proffered criteria for judging state sentences under a proportionality analysis were: first, to examine the nature of the crime; second, to compare the punishment imposed with similar sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime; and third, compare the punishment with punishments for other crimes in the same jurisdiction.
8 5 Justice Powell applied this test and concluded that a sentence of life in prison for three theft felonies constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
8 6 Thus, Powell asserted, the sentence should be overturned.
The Court reaffirmed its stance on subjecting state based sentences to proportionality analysis two years later in a per curiam decision. 88 The defendant in Hutto v. Davis was sentenced to twenty years incarceration for conviction in Virginia on two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. 89 The district court, using factors similar to those announced by Justice Powell in his dissent in Rummel, ignored the Court's majority opinion, and granted the respondent's habeas petition. 90 [Vol. 94
Justice Kennedy then reshaped the test set out by Justice Powell in his dissent in Rummel and the opinion in Solem. First, he performed a threshold analysis by examining the severity of the crime underlying the sentence and comparing it to the sentence, and found the situation harmonious with Hutto.' 8 Second, he folded Powell's inter-and intrajurisdictional analysis together, and suggested that such comparisons should be utilized only after a threshold examination of the crime and sentence yielded an inference of disproportionality.1 9 On the facts at hand, he saw no disproportionality and thus did not perform further inquiry. 2°J ustice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, examined Eighth Amendment history and concluded that proportionality analysis did not include an examination of a term-of-years sentence.' 2 ' Justice White authored a dissent highly critical of both Scalia and Kennedy.'
22 He asserted that Justice Scalia's historical analysis is inconclusive at best, and therefore the Court should use the lack of historical clarity to find a proportionality principal in the Eighth Amendment.1 23 White also attacked Kennedy's opinion for eviscerating the Solem test. 24 He contended that comparative analysis is a cornerstone of Eighth Amendment decision-making, and that relegating comparative analysis to the second tier ensures an inherently subjective analysis of any sentence.1 25 After performing the Solem test, White found the sentence, and therefore the Michigan law, unconstitutional.
C. HABEAS CORPUS AND THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
The Founders viewed the write of habeas corpus, often termed the Great Writ, to be a cornerstone among the tools that secure citizens' liberty interests. The writ of habeas corpus, often termed the Great Writ, was viewed by the Founders as a cornerstone among the tools that secure the liberty of citizens.' 7 The writ traces its roots in English history, where it was developed as an order to compel a person's appearance before a court. 1 28 The Founders saw fit to ensconce the writ in American law by protecting it from suspension except in extreme cases.
12 9 The Constitution provides that " [t] he Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."' 30 The first Congress codified the right to the writ in the Judiciary Act of 1789. At the end of the Civil War, the power of the writ was extended to state courts to ensure protection of the rights of the newly freed slaves in the South.
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The next major development in habeas occurred almost a century later. In Brown v. Allen, the Supreme Court held that criminals in state custody who had been convicted of a state offense were permitted to allege that they were being held in violation of federal law. 132 The Court ruled habeas corpus could be used as the vehicle to have those claims heard in federal district court. Rehnquist courts sought to check the ease by which state prisoners could use the writ by imposing exhaustion requirements, 40 limiting a prisoner's ability to make successive claims, 141 and disallowing retroactive application of new constitutional rules.1 42 These changes reflect the belief that the state and federal court systems should be utilized to generate synergies. 43 The Warren court era habeas jurisprudence had resulted in an inefficient use of judicial resources. 44 Additionally, the Court came to recognize the State interest in finality of adjudication of its criminal matters. 45 Finally, modem State courts could be trusted to respect the rights of unprotected minority
The twists and turns of forty years of habeas corpus rulings led to an inevitable result: a complicated morass of procedural rules threaded with exceptions that became unwieldy to exercise and adjudicate. 47 The costs arising from this convolution of law, including federal court time and effort, delay of claim resolution, and friction with state systems, did not escape Congressional notice. 48 Habeas reform became a major part of the political landscape during the 1994 Congressional races. 49 After the Republicans won control of the House and Senate in 1994, the legislative reforms moved forward. In Senate hearings, Senator Hatch enumerated the reasons for reform. First, delays between sentencing and resolution of the lawfulness of the sentence had detrimental effects by undermining public confidence in the criminal justice system, blurring the roles of the federal and state courts, and hampering the execution of justice without reciprocal improvements in 140 These political sentiments were a catalyzing force behind the development of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).
The structure of the habeas reform codified in the AEDPA was birthed out of the recommendations of a committee of federal judges. 52 Chief Justice Rehnquist commissioned the Committee to make legislative recommendations to address delays faced by States in carrying out death penalty sentences.
1 53 The Committee, chaired by retired Justice Powell, concluded that delays that occurred under the present regime of habeas law did not add to the fairness of the process. 54 Prisoners were bounced between the state and federal court systems during their collateral reviews. 1 Moreover, because prisoners were not limited in the number of habeas claims they could bring, they were able to file claims piecemeal in order to stretch out the process. 156 The Committee proposed a solution that would be optional for the states to participate in.1 57 The states could receive the benefits of the statute if they decided to provide competent council to capital defendants throughout the appeals process.
15 8 The reform was fairly simple: federal habeas claims must be filed within six months of the conclusion of direct review, 1 59 the defendant must exhaust all state court appeals before applying for federal relief, 160 and the claimant receives an automatic stay while the habeas issues are being resolved.' 61 Under this scheme, absent extraordinary circumstances, the defendant would only get one bite at the habeas apple. [Vol. 94
The suggestions of the Powell Committee became the bedrock of the reform efforts after the Republicans gained majorities in both the House and Senate in the 1994 election cycle.' 62 A few changes had been made to the original suggestion. First, the statute of limitations for filing a claim had been extended from six months to one year.' 63 Second, and more important to the substance of the reform, the new effort had decided to codify the standard of review to be applied by the federal courts when reviewing habeas petitions. 164 Congress was poised to require federal courts to defer to state court unless their judgments were "contrary to" or an "unreasonable application of' Supreme Court precedent, instead of making a de novo assessment of a habeas petitioner's claims. 65 The addition of this language marks congressional codification of deference accorded to states as cointerpreters of constitutional law.
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Consideration of the bill began in earnest in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing.
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The terrorist attack, combined with the Republican majority and a President anxious to be seen fighting terrorism, formed a "perfect storm" for passage of provisions significantly altering, and tightening up, federal habeas relief'1 68 President Clinton signed the AEDPA into law on April 24, 1996.169 He insisted that the standard of review language was not an abrogation of the responsibility of federal courts to apply their own analysis to state criminal cases. 70 The President was partly correct in his assessment of the Act's requirements of federal judges. Federal judges still review state court decisions, but now the focus shifted to the state court's opinion rather than the claims of the habeas petitioner. 17 Commentators were initially unsure of the extent of the AEDPA's reach. 172 review codified in the AEDPA.' 7 3 Writing for the majority on the issue of the statutory interpretation of the standard of review, Justice O'Conner defined both the "contrary to" and the "unreasonable application of' components of the new standard. 174 First, she defined "contrary to" as a state court decision that is "substantially different" from Supreme Court precedent.1 75 Two instances appear in which a state court may run afoul of the "contrary to" provision of the Act. 176 The state court could apply a rule of law that conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, or the state court could apply the correct rule to a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court decision and get a result opposite the Court's ruling. 177 Second, O'Conner laid out the process for determining when a state court decision could be an "unreasonable application of' the appropriate Supreme Court precedent. 78 She conclusively rejected the "reasonable jurist" standard as too subjective, and opted instead to direct the federal inquiry to determine if the application of precedent was "objectively unreasonable."' 179 She specifically forbade the federal jurist from applying his or her own independent judgment to the habeas claim, and then turning to the state court judge's application of the law and simply saying the state court judge was wrong. 1 80 The federal judge must determine that in getting the application wrong, the state court judge's application of that law was "objectively unreasonable."' ' 8 1 Thus, federal judges must now assess state court judgments as co-equal in their interpretation and application of federal constitutional law when deciding a habeas case. He walked over to the electronics section, looked around, picked up some videotapes, and put them in his pants. 184 The videotapes he had selected were children's movies (Snow White, Casper, The Fox and the Hound, The Pebble and the Penguin, and Batman Forever) with a total value of $84.70.185
Andrade left the Kmart without paying for the videotapes and loss prevention personnel from the store apprehended him in the store parking lot, took the videotapes away, and had Andrade arrested for shoplifting.
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Exactly two weeks later, on November 18, 1995, Andrade entered a Kmart in Montclair, California.1
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After walking over to the electronics section, he selected some videotapes and put them down his pants.
8 8 Once again, Andrade selected children's movies (Free Willy 2, Cinderella, Santa Clause, and Little Women) with a total value of $68.84.189 He left the store without paying for the videotapes; loss prevention stopped him in the parking lot, recovered the merchandise, and held him until the police arrived to arrest him for shoplifting.' 90 Andrade, in his statement to authorities, admitted to stealing the videos and asserted his theft was motivated by a heroin addiction that had plagued him since 1977.' 9 '
Leandro Andrade is a U.S. Army veteran and father of three children.' 92 At the time these shoplifting incidents occurred, Andrade was addicted to heroin, unmarried, unemployed, and did not help support his children.' 9 His criminal career had spanned more than a decade. Andrade's first conviction came in January 1982, when he was sentenced to six days in jail with twelve months probation for misdemeanor theft. 94 A little more than a year later, he pled guilty to three counts of residential burglary, and was sentenced to 120 months in prison.
1 95 These charges are viewed as "serious or violent" felonies under California law. 196 In 1988, Andrade was convicted in Federal court for transporting marijuana, a felony charge that earned him an eight year sentence.' 97 In March 1990, he was convicted of petty theft in California state court and sentenced to six months in jail.
198 Later that year he was again convicted of transportation of marijuana in Federal court where he remained until September 1991-when he violated his state parole by attempting to escape from prison. 199 Andrade was paroled from the state prison system in February 1993. 200 The That statute provides that a subsequent conviction for petty theft following a prior like conviction can be charged as a felony, making the new charges "wobble" between misdemeanor and felony status. 20 6 The prosecutor chose to charge these "wobblers," the two new shoplifting offenses, as felonies. 20 7 Once the thefts were charged as felonies, the probation officer was bound by law to recommend the harshest possible punishment allowed by the law-twenty-five years to life for each count-because it was Andrade's third and fourth offenses. 2°8 The jury made the required special finding that Andrade had been convicted of two or more serious felonies in California (the 1982 burglary convictions), which opened the way for application of the three strikes law. 20 9 Because each of the felony theft counts triggered separate application of the three strikes law, the judge was allowed to sentence Andrade to fifty years to life. on behalf of Andrade, and remanded the case to state court for resentencing. 22 ' The Ninth Circuit adopted the proportionality reasoning proffered by Justice Kennedy in Harmelin at the beginning of its analysis of the habeas 222 petition.
The court concluded that Harmelin meant that Solem's second and third factors, intra-jurisdictional and inter-jurisdictional comparisons, need not be applied unless a defendant's sentence raises an inference of gross disproportionality. 2 23 First, the court examined the harshness of the penalty and the gravity of the theft offense. 224 The court found that Andrade's mandatory minimum fifty year sentence will result in him spending most of his life in prison, and thus the case comported more with the facts of Solem than those of Rummel. 225 Next, the court noted under California law petty theft is usually a misdemeanor, and a construction of California law accelerated the misdemeanor petty theft charges to felonies eligible for strike count. 6 Additionally, the court observed the prior felony strikes and concluded the absence of violence likened the case to Solem. 227 Finally, the court ruled that the length of the sentence coupled with the lack of seriousness of the crimes created an inference of gross disproportionality. 22 8 After determining the threshold from Harmelin had been met, the court applied the second and third prongs of the Solem test. 229 The court found Andrade's sentence to be disproportionate when compared to mandatory minimum sentences for a two-time petty theft offender and a violent first time offender.
Next, the court found Andrade's sentence to be disproportionate to possible punishment in other jurisdictions that have similar recidivist statutes. 23 Andrade argued his consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting violated the Eighth Amendment. 240 The majority rejected Andrade's habeas claim. 24 ' In doing so, the Court then overruled the Ninth Circuit's review of the state court and its application of Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis to Leandro Andrade's sentence. 242 The Court refused to reach the merits of the state court decision, and instead evaluated the state court's decision under the AEDPA's standard of review. 243 First, the Court determined the appropriate law to apply to a term-of-years inquiry. 244 The court stated that "clearly established" law refers to Supreme Court holdings, and not dicta, in effect at the time the state court makes its decision. 24 5 The Court's Eighth Amendment cases do hold that a proportionality principle is applicable to a term-of-years sentence.6 But the holdings that derive a proportionality principle from the Eighth Amendment are unclear in their application of that principle. 247 Indeed, the Court has not established a consistent path for courts to follow on when to apply the proportionality principle. 248 While the contours of the principle are unclear, precedent dictates that application of the principle will be rare; it will only be applied in extreme cases. 2 49 Next, the Court proceeded to recite situations in which a state court ruling is "contrary to" federal law, and evaluated whether the California court's ruling was contrary to the law. 250 The Court explained that a state court ruling is "contrary to" precedent if the state court applies a legal rule opposite to governing precedent, or a state court confronts a fact pattern that is indistinguishable from a precedent case yet yields a result different from the precedent. 25 1 In Andrade's case, the factual situation implicated factors present in both Rummel and Solem, 252 yet was distinguishable from both those cases. 3 Because both cases remain good law, the California court could not reach a result "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent in following either one. 54 Additionally, because Andrade's facts were sufficiently distinguishable from both cases, the California court was not bound to one specific precedent case. 55 Thus, the California court ruling was not "contrary to" precedent because it chose to rely on the Court's holding in
Rummel.
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Finally, the Court evaluated the conditions under which a state court makes an "unreasonable application of' a precedential rule to a new factual situation.
The Court stated that in order to overturn a state court application of a federal rule, that court's application of the rule must have 245 Id. at 71-72. 246 Id. at 72. [Vol. 94 been "objectively unreasonable. 58 Thus, the Ninth Circuit erred when it applied a "clear error" standard to its evaluation of the state court decision, because clear error fails to give proper deference to the state decision. 2 59 The Court said that the proper standard to apply is the "objectively unreasonable" standard. 26 0 This standard allows a federal habeas court to grant relief if the state court misapplies federal law to a new set of facts. 6 But the rule for applying the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle is unclear. 2 62 This lack of clarity provides for substantial deference to legislatures as they attempt to fashion sentences that fit within the rubric of the proportionality principle. 263 Therefore, the California court's affirmation of Andrade's sentence was not "objectively unreasonably" because the Supreme Court had not substantially defined the proportionality rule. 264 Instead, the California court reasonably assumed that the Supreme Court had crafted a rule that granted substantial deference to the state sovereignty in the development of their penological systems. Solem. 271 He noted that the only way to distinguish between Andrade's facts and the facts in Solem was that Andrade faced a possibility of parole in his fifty year sentence, while the respondent in Solem faced a mandatory life sentence. 272 Next, Souter contended that the challenge in the instant case was not to the sentence as a whole, but only to the second sentence of twenty-five years to life for the second shoplifting incident. 273 Souter reasoned that since the legislature's goal was essentially to incarcerate a repeat offender because of the danger he posed to society, and the state had chosen twentyfive years to life as the appropriate sentence to accomplish that goal, double-counting the second offense violated the state's own penalogical theory. 274 Moreover, the California Court of Appeal offered no justification for allowing the double counting of Andrade's second shoplifting offense when it reviewed his gross disporportionality claim. 275 Souter assumed that the theory underlying double-counting Andrade's second offense would be the same as the first: continued danger to the public. 276 He rejected this notion, asserting that basing two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life on that penalogical theory is not seriously debatable among reasonable minds. 2 77 Thus, the second sentence was unreasonable under the federal statute. 278 
V. ANALYSIS
The Court correctly held that the California Court of Appeal decision affirming Andrade's term-of-years sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. First, while a proportionality principle exists in the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, its application has been disjointed and ambiguous, leaving much room for states to exercise discretion. Given the ambiguity in this area of constitutional law, any question about its application should be resolved in favor of the states. Since the California Court of Appeal was within the auspices of precedent in upholding Andrade's sentence, the Court's opinion was correct.
Second, though a proportionality principle operating on a term-ofyears sentence is recognized in the Eighth Amendment, that principle should in no way be utilized as a vehicle to undermine the rights of States to develop penalogical systems that fit the needs of the day. A beneficial aspect of federalism is the ability of States to experiment with their criminal justice systems to find an efficient pattern. California's three strikes law has faced much criticism, and Andrade's sentence may not seem to make good sense, but some evidence indicates the law is having a beneficial effect. Further, the people of California are capable of adjusting the statutory scheme.
Finally, modem Supreme Court jurisprudence has moved toward recognizing state courts as co-equal interpreters of constitutional criminal law. Moreover, the framers of the AEDPA's habeas provision constructed the reform to curtail federal intrusion into State criminal systems. The Court correctly followed modem constitutional doctrine and congressional intent when it directed the Ninth Circuit to grant substantial deference to the State of California. Thus the Rehnquist Court, with the statutory authority granted by Congress, has fully come to realize its ideological prerogative that state courts are co-equal with their federal counterparts in constitutional interpretation.
A. THE AMBIGUITY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE IN PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS GRANTED LEEWAY TO THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL TO UPHOLD ANDRADE'S SENTENCE
The Lockyer Court faced a situation in which a federal court reversed a state court's decision about a state mandated criminal sentence. 279 The state court based its decision to uphold Andrade's sentence on viable Supreme Court precedent by analyzing it under Rummel. 280 Then the state court's effort was supplanted by two judges on the Ninth Circuit who wanted the state court to follow Solem, the other case that could have governed the analysis. 28 ' However, the Court had already announced a principle that state court decisions deserve respect when they are based on existing law and made in good faith. 282 with a possibly dubious analytical structure to apply to proportionality cases. 2 83 Further, the state court demonstrated good faith when it applied the state's equivalent of the Solem test yet still found Andrade's sentence to be viable. 84 Finally, the AEPDA mandated that the state court's decision must be unreasonable before a reviewing federal court could overturn it. 285 The state court reasonably relied on Rummel, which was good law, when it analyzed Andrade's sentence. 2 86 Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision to reverse the Ninth Circuit was proper.
A close reading of Rummel and Solem underscores the difficult task faced by the state court trying to apply the proportionality principle to Andrade's sentence. As the previous cases have shown, the area of law governing Eighth Amendment proportionality is anything but clear. 287 In Solem, the Court emphasized that it did not overrule Rummel. 288 Because the Solem Court went out of its way to affirm Rummel as good law, 289 the majority opinion in Solem can be viewed as merely offering a framework under which a court could review a sentence, should it determine the instant sentence was one that merited proportionality review. 290 Interpreting Rummel in his dissent in Solem, Chief Justice Burger asserted that Rummel stood for the proposition that when developing sentencing schemes for felonies, state legislatures were established in their primacy. 291 Thus, Solem can be read as an attempt to standardize proportionality review, with a dissent that re-emphasizes importance of legislative prerogatives. But this conclusion is inconsistent with the Solem majority's assertion that "no penalty is per se constitutional. 29 2 Therefore, distinguishing between Rummel and Solem operationally as legal principles is almost impossible.
To better understand the difficulty of distinguishing between Rummel and Solem, one must reject the notion that applying proportionality analysis to a term-of-years sentence was a practice agreed on by both majorities. [Vol. 94
The majority in Rummel made one allowance for proportionality analysis outside the death penalty context-parking tickets that carried a life sentence as punishment-obviously an ad absurdum argument. 294 The majority based most of its reasoning on a utilitarian states rights argument-states can deal in a harsher manner with those who chose not to conform to societal norms. 295 Further, courts applying Rummel thought it eliminated proportionality analysis except in the absurd. 96 Such cases indicate that the Rummel decision removed state sentencing decisions from federal court review. 297 Moreover, the Rummel dissent rejected utilitarian analysis in favor of a fairness assessment encompassed in the proportionality principle. 29 8 Powell maintained that the Eight Amendment should be used to ensure fairness in state sentencing. 299 Finally, Justice Powell's dissent went through an extensive historical analysis to justify proportionality review of non-capital sentences in Anglo-American law. 300 He engaged in this cataloging to show how the proportionality principle should be applied. 30 1 Therefore, the Supreme Court decision in Rummel was understood to remove state imposed criminal sentences from federal court review.
On the other hand, the majority opinion in Solem was written in a way to debilitate the reasoning expressed in Rummel. 3 2 Powell subjected all sentences to proportionality review when he announced that no state sentence carries a presumption of constitutionality. 3 3 Additionally, the analytic structure Powell used to evaluate the sentence in Solem was rejected by Rummel as too subjective.
3 0 4 Moreover, the dissent in Solem categorically rejects Powell's interpretation that Rummel announced an acceptance of proportionality analysis applied to a term-of-years sentence. 30 
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Two competing interpretative theories emerged in academia in an attempt to reconcile the cases. 310 First, the cases could be read as setting lines of demarcation that require a two tier analysis.
31 1 Initially, a court must determine whether the sentence is disproportionate (i.e., does it better match the facts of Rummel or Solem). 312 If Rummel governs on the facts, then the sentence is constitutional and no further inquiry is needed. 31 3 On the other hand, if a case matched Solem on the facts, then a court must employ the subjective factors announced in that decision to determine the sentence's constitutional viability.
31 4 Unfortunately, this theory leaves a gap where neither Rummel (life sentence with parole available in twelve years) nor Solem (life sentence without parole) give clear instruction. 315 This gap occurs where the sentence amounts to something less than life in prison, or where the past crimes that caused application of the recidivist statute carried a greater threat of violence than the instant crime (e.g., a recidivist statute's application triggered by a car theft when the offender had two previous convictions for armed robbery). 3 16 Also, the cases could be read so that Solem eviscerated Rummel.
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After all, Solem rejected the idea that any sentence is per se constitutionally 320 Finally, Solem asserted that judges can serve as good arbiters of whether a sentence is disproportional. 3 2 ' Powell dismissed Rummel's assertion that proportionality was too subjective to be applied by the judiciary. 322 Therefore, reconciling these two cases, while yielding one applicable legal principle, was exceedingly difficult. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin attempted to harmonize the two cases by distilling the fundamental principles underlying proportionality analysis. 323 He concluded that "[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime. ' 324 His analysis focused on the severity of the crime in relation to the sentence imposed. 325 Kennedy then said that interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional comparisons should only be made on those rare occasions in which the judge infers gross disproportionality between crime and sentence. 326 Thus, he adopted a two-tiered approach similar to the one described at footnote 310 above. 327 333 In order to make a distinction between the cases based on these factors, the discussion has to be ripped out of its context. A review of Rummel shows that the factors of the Texas statute were not discussed at length to inform as to constitutionally positive factors present in a recidivist statute. Instead, the statute's factors were part of a larger discussion of how the petitioner's argument that the Texas law was disproportionate when compared to other jurisdictions erupted in an unending variable analysis. 334 Even if these factors are employed to discern a distinction between Rummel and Andrade's case, the Ninth Circuit ignores the fact that both the prosecutor and the judge could dismiss the counts against Andrade. 335 Additionally, the dissent in Rummel categorically rejected using probability of parole as a validating instrument for proportionality analysis because a prisoner has no constitutionally enforceable right to an early release from a legally imposed sentence. 336 Thus, the Ninth Circuit gave no reason why the California court should have followed Solem rather than Rummel. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly reversed the Ninth Circuit. In choosing to analyze Andrade's sentence under Rummel, the California Court of Appeal had acted in good faith. 337 By following Rummel, the state court adopted the deferential doctrine announced by that decision.
338
Because Rummel remained good law, and the Harmelin decision had weakened Solem, the state court's reliance on Rummel was reasonable. 339 Further, the Ninth Circuit was unable to show anything unreasonable about the state court's adoption of Rummel. 340 Hence, the Lockyer decision comports with AEDPA's reasonableness requirement. 332 Id. 01-1127) . 340 See supra text accompanying notes 330-36.
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Perhaps the most overlooked part of this ruling is what did not happen. It bears mentioning that no one offered a concurrence to Justice O'Conner's assertion that the proportionality principle is established in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Even so, Lockyer affirms that the AEDPA's limits on habeas review extend to the proportionality principle so that the principle's application to state imposed sentences during federal court review is limited to instances that are factually identical to Solem or so absurd that they shock the conscience.
341
After Lockyer, a state court performing proportionality analysis is free to compare a case to the facts of Rummel when deciding it meets the threshold of gross disproportionality set out in Harmelin. 342 Therefore, the ruling in Lockyer guarantees that federal court invocation of the proportionality principle is limited to absurd instances, such as the example given in Rummel. 343 
B. THE COURT CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD THAT PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE TO THE STATES
The Lockyer Court properly found California's application of its own law to be valid. The Court has traditionally recognized that dual sovereignty in federalism results in experimentation by States. 344 The Court has also acknowledged that its actions should not inhibit such experimentation in the States. 345 California's three strikes law was a prototype crafted to deal with recidivist criminals in that state. 346 The law's result was a sentence imposed on Andrade, a recidivist offender.
3 47 Thus, Andrade's sentence, because it is based on a law enacted by a state to deal with crime in that state, deserves deference from a federal reviewing court. 34 8 Indeed, one of the benefits of our federal system is diversity among the States in deciding how to deal with social problems. 349 Admittedly, states have purposed recidivist statutes to deter potential repeat offenders, and segregate from society those who will not conform to societal expectations. 35° California's treatment of petty theft as a "wobbler" subject to progressively harsher treatment is no less rational than Texas treating horse thieves more stringently than Rhode Island. 35 ' In terms of comparative review, a sentence resulting from a statutory scheme that punishes an offender more harshly than would any of the other forty-nine states does not necessarily mean the punishment is disproportionate to the crime. 3 52 Thus, because "our constitution 'is made for people of fundamentally different views, ' 353 and three time offenders have demonstrated their unwillingness to conform to societal norms, 354 California has the right as a sovereign to segregate Andrade from the rest of society.
In Solem, the Court recognized the proposition that state legislatures have broad authority to design punishments for crime in their jurisdictions. 3 55 California's three strikes law falls within that broad discretion. 356 Additionally, state courts that are imposing sentences under authority granted by the legislature must be accorded substantial deference. 357 The deference accorded legislatures is transmitted to the state judiciary. 3 58 Further, the fact that the Court has acknowledged invalidating a twenty-five year sentence but not a fifteen year sentence shows how difficult the proportionality principle is to operate. 359 Because of the difficulty that courts face when making these subjective judgments, the legislature is the best place for these decisions to be made. 360 Hence, reviewing courts should grant substantial deference to States when assessing whether a sentence is grossly disproportional. 361 Instances of the Supreme Court overruling legislatively sanctioned sentences, outside the death penalty context, are "exceedingly rare." 362 Indeed, only two such instances have occurred in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The first was Robinson v. California, 363 where the Court invalidated a California sentence of ninety days for the offense of being a drug addict. 364 The other was Solem. Moreover, legislatures are especially equipped to deal with the subjective nature of the line drawing in this area of proportionality, 365 whereas judicial action that overturns sentences sanctioned by statute undermines public confidence in constitutional order and the rule of law.
36 6 Passage of recidivist statutes such as the California three strikes law seems to indicate a lack of public confidence in the judiciary's ability, or perhaps willingness, to see to its protection. 367 As much as such laws, and the sentences they impose, may be contrary to a sitting judge's views on the goals of the criminal justice system, the determination of those goals belongs to the legislative body. 368 In other words, the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle cannot be employed to enforce contemporary views of crime and appropriate punishment, denying States the ability to constitute a penalogical scheme that fits the needs of the day. 369 Therefore, use of the proportionality principle should be limited to those rare situations in which reasonable minds cannot differ about the sentence imposed. 370 Any other use of the proportionality principle would be inimical to our federal order. 371 Finally, the California three strikes law carries an even heavier presumption of validity because it passed both the legislature and a ballot initiative that went directly to the people. Proposition 184 garnered seventy-two percent of the vote: a supermajority.
3 7 3 The ramifications of implementing the law, such as imprisoning offenders like Andrade, had been voiced to the public in the debate over Proposition 184.
Thus, the public knew what the likely results of the law were when they voted for it. Moreover, the people of California are capable of correcting any perceived result of applying the proportionality principle under the AEDPA before the Lockyer case was ever decided. 384 Important ideas about our constitutional structure underlay passage of the AEDPA. One such notion is efficient allocation of limited judicial resources, which was the cornerstone of this reform. 385 Federal judges have increasingly full dockets, and should not serve as courts that retry criminal cases. 386 Additionally, the lion's share of the cost of federal habeas review is born by the State. 387 Among these costs are the extended litigation a
State must face at the Federal level, the uncertainty or delay in enforcement of its laws against criminal defendants, costs of retrial if a sentence is overturned, and the comity among dual sovereigns that does not honor good faith effort by State courts to enforce constitutional norms.
388
The reasonableness language in the AEDPA strikes a proper balance between states' interests in protecting their citizenry, allocating their judicial resources, and maintaining a baseline of constitutional rights accorded to all convicts. 389 Additionally, the AEDPA codified reforms set in motion by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. 390 The Act is a major turn away from the Warren court era use of habeas to enforce new criminal procedure rights on state judges. 39 ' Therefore, the AEDPA's history and language ensures
Lockyer was decided in line with congressional intent to limit habeas. 392 
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court ruling in Lockyer clarifies application of the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle in post-AEDPA habeas review. A narrow proportionality principle exists, and should only be employed to overturn a State imposed sentence permitted by a statutory 384 See id. (noting several justices' requests that the Court accept a direct challenge of California's three strikes provision because of the uncertain implications of AEDPA standard of review). 385 See Powell Committee Report, supra note 153; see generally Rehnquist, supra note scheme in extreme circumstances. Many reasons for such a high level of deference to states underlay the Court's ruling. Chief among those is congressional intent, expressed in the standard of review for federal habeas proceedings, ensconced in the AEDPA. Because of the ambiguity in Supreme Court precedent regarding the proportionality principle and the language of the AEDPA, the California Court of Appeal was free to choose among the competing doctrines about the role of proportionality in sentencing. Additionally, judicial economy and ideas of federalism require deference to state court decisions. The California three strikes law is a legitimate exercise of state sovereignty, and sentences meted out according to its provisions deserve respect, despite judges' feelings about the outcome of the statute. Finally, the Lockyer decision reflects a broader notion that state courts, after a half century of tutoring by federal courts on the proper application of criminal constitutional rights, have sufficiently matured to become coequal interpreters of constitutional law. Doyle Horn [Vol. 94 
